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ABSTRACT
A variable free notation for dynamic logic is proposed which takes its cue from De Bruijn's variable free notation
for lambda calculus. De Bruijn indexing replaces variables by indices which indicate the distance to their binders.
We propose to use reverse De Bruijn indexing, which works almost the same, only now the indices refer to the
depth of the binding operator in the formula. The resulting system is analysed at length and applied to a new
rational reconstruction of discourse representation theory. It is argued that the present system of dynamic logic
without variables provides an explicit account of anaphoric context and yields new insight into the dynamics of
anaphoric linking in reasoning. A calculus for dynamic reasoning with anaphora is presented and its soundness
and completeness are established.
1991 Mathematics Subject Classication: 03B65, 68Q55,
1991 Computing Reviews Classication System: I.2.4, I.2.7
Keywords and Phrases: dynamic semantics, natural language processing, anaphora and context, dynamic rea-
soning with anaphora
Note: Work carried out under project P4303; paper under review.
1. Introduction
In recent developments of natural language semantics, problems of pronominal reference ana anaphoric
linking have inspired logicians to a dynamic turn in natural language semantics. This started with
Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp [14]) and File Change Semantics (Heim [12]), and various
rational reconstructions of these proposals, with Barwise [3] and Groenendijk and Stokhof [10] as the
most prominent ones.
The gist of these proposals is that the static variable binding regime from standard predicate logic
gets replaced by a dynamic regime, where meanings are viewed as relations between variable states in
a model.
In the original version of the `dynamic shift', the basic ingredients are contexts and constraints on
contexts. A Kamp-style representation for a piece of text (or: discourse) looks basically like this:
context
constraints
on
context
The informal picture of how the information conveyed by a piece of text grows is that of `updating'
of representation structures:
2context
constraints
on
context
 !
new context
new constraints
on
context
This picture can only be made to work if we make sure that the contexts are represented smartly.
Contexts are essentially sets of variables: a context just is a list of dynamically bound variables. These
variables represent the antecedents which are available in any extension of that context. Embedded
contexts (contexts occurring inside the constraints on a given context) and extensions of contexts
(representing extensions of anaphoric possibilities) should always employ fresh variables, for if they
do not, existing anaphoric possibilities get blocked o by destructive value assignment.
The rational reconstructions of dynamic discourse representation given by Barwise [3] and Groe-
nendijk and Stokhof [10] essentially represent introduction of new antecedents by means of random
assignment to a variable. The meaning of 9x becomes the relation between variable states f; g with
the property that f and g dier at most in their x value:
f
[[9x]]
g
i f [x]g:
This does indeed solve the problem of how to use dynamic scoping of variables to account for un-
bounded anaphoric linkings, but it does not give a rational reconstruction of the fact that discourse
representation is supposed to work incrementally.
What one would like is illustrated by the following example, where we assume an initial represen-
tation for the sentence `A man entered', which gets updated by subsequent processing of `A woman
entered', and next of `He smiled at her.'
x
Mx
Ex
! `A woman entered' !
x y
Mx
Ex
Wy
Ey
! `He smiled at her' !
x y
Mx
Ex
Wy
Ey
Sxy
In a rational reconstruction of this, one would assume that the sentences to be added to the existing
representation have a representation of their own, so one would get something like:
x
Mx
Ex
+
y
My
Ey
=
x y
Mx
Ex
Wy
Ey
Problem: what happens if we get a variable clash:
x
Mx
Ex
+
x
Mx
Ex
= ?
3In Kamp's original version of discourse representation theory, and also in the extended version pre-
sented in Kamp and Reyle [15], this problem does not occur, for the algorithm presented there always
parses new sentences in the context of an existing representation structure, and for any indenite
noun phrase it encounters, it simply gives the instruction: `take a fresh variable.' In other words,
Kamp never merges representation structures. In an algebraic reconstruction of the theory we want
to be able to do so. There are various approaches to the merge problem for DRSs (see Van Eijck
and Kamp [9] for an overview). These amount to various ways of avoiding destructive assignments
to variables, i.e., to various ways of arriving at structures which can be interpreted monotonically in
terms of an information ordering on the meanings of the representation structures.
In this paper we will argue that a variable free representation of dynamic logic leads to a very
natural monotonic interpretation, and thus to a natural solution to the merge problem. We get `fresh
variables' for free if we replace the (static or dynamic) variable binding mechanism of static or dynamic
predicate logic with an indexing mechanism. We will illustrate this rst for standard predicate logic,
and next for its dynamic relative.
2. Predicate Logic Without Variables
Predicate logics without variables have a long history. Starting point is the method of `explaining
variables away' of Quine [?, ?]. Based on this, Kuhn [17] and Purdy [18] have proposed variable
free representations for natural language understanding. Based on an even older approach (Peirce's
existential graphs), Sanchez [20] has developed a variable free natural logic. There is also a long
tradition of variable free notation in lambda calculus: combinatory logic (see [2]) and De Bruijn
indices [6] come to mind here. We will take our cue from this tradition.
The De Bruijn notation for lambda calculus consists of replacing variables by indices that indicate
the distance to their binding lambda operator. The lambda term xy:(z:(y(zx))(yx) is written
in De Bruijn notation as :(:(2 (1 3))(1 2). This approach carries over to predicate logic in a
straightforward fashion. Let C be a set of individual constants and P a set of predicate constants
of given arities. Assume c ranges over C and P is an n-place predicate constant from P. Then the
language of De Bruijn style predicate logic without variables is given by:
t ::= c j 1 j 2 j   
 ::= Pt
1
   t
n
j : j (
1
^ 
2
) j 9 j 8:
Here are some examples of De Bruijn style notation for predicate logic, with corresponding rst order
formulas in the familiar notation.
(9P1 ^ 9Q1) 9xPx ^ 9xQx
9(P1 ^Q1) 9x(Px ^Qx)
98R12 9x8yRyx
8R1 1 8xRxx
8R2 2 8xRyy
The predicate logical formulas on the right are meant as translations modulo alphabetical variance, of
course. To judge the correspondences (especially the last one, for unbound variables), an independent
semantics for the language is needed.
The clauses of the truth relation j=
dB
below are stated in terms of a model M = hM; Ii and a
sequence  2M
N
+
. We will use c
M
for4 I(c) and P
M
for I(P ). Also, we use 
k
for the k-th element
of . Also if a 2 M and k 2 N
+
, [k := a] denotes the sequence 
0
given by 
0
m
= 
m
for m 6= k,

0
m
= a for m = k.
First we dene term denotations:
[[t]]
M

:=

t
M
if t 2 C;

t
if t 2 N
+
:
4In the denition of interpretations for formulas we need a function for the quantier depth of a formula:
d(Pt
1
   t
n
) := 0
d(:) := d()
d(
1
^ 
2
) := max(d(
1
); d(
2
))
d(9) := d() + 1
d(8) := d() + 1:
We use this in the truth denition, as follows:
M;  j=
dB
Pt
1
   t
n
i h[[t
1
]]
M

; : : : ; [[t
n
]]
M

i 2 P
M
M;  j=
dB
: i M;  6j=
dB

M;  j=
dB
(
1
^ 
2
) i M;  j=
dB

1
and M;  j=
dB

2
M;  j=
dB
9 i for some a 2M; M; [d() + 1 := a] j=
dB

M;  j=
dB
8 i for every a 2M; M; [d() + 1 := a] j=
dB
:
Assuming a set of indexed variables V = fx
1
; x
2
; : : : g, a translation

from De Bruijn notation to
standard notation is now given by:
t

:=

t if t 2 C
x
t
if t 2 N
+
(Pt
1
   t
n
)

:= Pt

1
   t

n
(:)

:= :()

(
1
^ 
2
)

:= (

1
^ 

2
)
(9)

:= 9x
d()+1


(8)

:= 8x
d()+1


:
If  2 M
N
+
, we may regard  as an assignment in M
V
(given by (x
k
) = 
k
). The following
proposition gives the connection between De Bruijn style predicate logic and standard predicate logic.
Proposition 1 For every  2 L
0
:
M;  j=
dB
 i M;  j= 

:
Proof. Induction on the structure of .
Here is the reasoning for the existential quantier case. M;  j=
dB
9 i there is some a 2M with
M; [d()+1 := a] j=
dB
 i there is some a 2M with M; [x
d()+1
:= a] j= 

i M;  j= 9x
d()+1


i M;  j= (9)

. a
Surprisingly, De Bruijn style predicate logic turns out to be a notational variant of the system of
variable free predicate logic proposed in Ben-Shalom [4].
As an alternative to the De Bruijn style binding regime, where the binding quantier is found by
counting from the inside out, it is also possible to count from the outside in. This is similar to the way
lambdas are counted in Cartesian closed category models of the lambda calculus (see e.g. Gunter [11,
Ch. 3]). Call this `reverse De Bruijn style' (see also Aczel [1]). The language remains the same, but
the truth denition becomes slightly more involved. It is given as a sequence of relations j=
1
; j=
2
; : : : .
The term interpretation function [[]]
M

remains as before. The truth denition becomes (k 2 N
+
):
M;  j=
k
Pt
1
   t
n
i h[[t
1
]]
M

; : : : ; [[t
n
]]
M

i 2 P
M
M;  j=
k
: i M;  6j=
k

M;  j=
k
(
1
^ 
2
) i M;  j=
k

1
and M;  j=
k

2
M;  j=
k
9 i for some a 2M; M; [k := a] j=
k+1

M;  j=
k
8 i for every a 2M; M; [k := a] j=
k+1
:
The reverse De Bruijn interpretation relation j=
rdB
is the relation j=
0
.
5Here is a set of translation functions
(k)
from reverse De Bruijn style predicate logic to standard
rst order logic. The translation

for terms remains as before.
(Pt
1
   t
n
)
(k)
:= Pt

1
   t

n
(:)
(k)
:= :()
(k)
(
1
^ 
2
)
(k)
:= (
(k)
1
^ 
(k)
2
)
(9)
(k)
:= 9x
k

(k+1)
(8)
(k)
:= 8x
k

(k+1)
:
Proposition 2 For all  2 L
0
:
M;  j=
rdB
 i M;  j= 
(0)
:
Proof. The proposition follows from a more general statement which we prove by induction on the
complexity of . For all  2 L
0
, all k 2 N
+
:
M;  j=
k
 i M;  j= 
(k)
:
Here is the reasoning for the existential quantier case. M;  j=
k
9 i there is some a 2 M with
M; [k := a] j=
k+1
 i there is some a 2 M with M; [x
k
:= a] j= 
(k+1)
i M;  j= 9x
k

(k+1)
i
M;  j= (9)
(k)
. a
3. Dynamic Predicate Logic Without Variables
The language L of variable free dynamic predicate logic has 9 as a formula in its own right, and
replaces ^ with a connective ; for sequential composition.
t ::= c j 1 j 2 j   
A ::= ? j 9 j Pt
1
   t
n
 ::= A j A; j :():
Note that we have built into the language that ; creates a at list structure.
We will omit unnecessary parentheses, writing :(Pt
1
   t
n
) as :Pt
1
   t
n
, etcetera. Occasionally, we
will write 9; as 9. Also, we abbreviate :? as >, and :(
1
;    ;
n
;:
n+1
) as (
1
;    ;
n
)! 
n+1
.
The static interpretation is replaced by a dynamic one. Interpretation of terms as before. For the
dynamic interpretation relation it is more convenient to use reverse De Bruijn style than regular De
Bruijn style. The reason is the following.
The key feature of dynamic predicate logic is the ability of the existential quantier to bind variables
outside its proper scope. Consider the DPL text 9x;Px; 9y;Qy;Rxy. Here the x and y of Rxy are
bound outside of the proper scope by 9x and 9y respectively, so variables can be viewed as anaphoric
elements linked to a preceding existential quantier that introduces a referent. The regular De Bruijn
analogue of this text would be the following:
9;P1; 9;Q1;R2 1
Here anaphoric coreference (or: dynamic binding) is no longer encoded by use of the same index,
but the antecedent of an index has to be worked out taking the `existential depth' of the intervening
formula into account.
Regular De Bruijn style interpretation of the existential quantier employs the following stack
instruction:
M; ; 
0
j= 9 i 
0
= a^  for some a 2M:
Here a^  denotes the sequence 
0
with 
0
1
= a and 
0
k
= 
k 1
for k > 1.
6The awkwardness in antecedent recovery can be avoided by using reverse De Bruijn indexing. As
in the case of reverse indexing for variable free predicate logic, we dene the truth relation in stages.
We use [k]
0
to indicate that  and 
0
dier at most at position k. We also need a function for
existential depth of L formulas. The existential depth of a formula is given by:
e(?) := 0
e(9) := 1
e(Pt
1
   t
n
) := 0
e(A;) := e(A) + e()
e(:()) := 0:
This function is used in the clause for sequential composition in the following semantic stipulations:
M; ; 
0
j=
k
? never
M; ; 
0
j=
k
9 i [k + 1]
0
M; ; 
0
j=
k
Pt
1
   t
n
i  = 
0
and h[[t
1
]]
M

; : : : ; [[t
n
]]
M

i 2 P
M
M; ; 
0
j=
k
(A;) i there is a 
00
with M; ; 
00
j=
k
A and M; 
00
; 
0
j=
k+e(A)

M; ; 
0
j=
k
:() i  = 
0
and there is no 
00
with M; ; 
00
j=
k
:
As in the case of reverse De Bruijn style predicate logic, we use j=
rdB
for the relation j=
0
.
The denition of j=
rdB
for L is in fact a straightforward adaptation of the dynamic semantics for
predicate logic dened in Groenendijk and Stokhof [10], which is in turn closely related to a proposal
made by Barwise in [3].
However, this semantics is not equivalent to the semantics given by Groenendijk and Stokhof, but
has an important advantage over it. In Groenendijk and Stokhof's semantics for DPL, a repeated as-
signment to a single variable by means of a repeated use of the same existential quantier-variable com-
bination blocks o the individual introduced by the rst use of the quantier from further anaphoric
reference. After 9xPx; 9xQx, the variable x will refer to the individual introduced by 9xQx, and the
individual introduced by 9xPx has become inaccessible.
In the sequence semantics proposed by Vermeulen [23] this problem is solved by making every
variable refer to a stack, and interpreting an existential quantication for variable x as a push operation
on the x stack. The quantication 9x now gets a counterpart xE, interpreted as a pop of the x stack.
In the j=
dB
semantics for L one uses a single innite stack, and one doesn't allow pops (if existential
quantication is to be non-destructive). In our reverse De Bruijn style semantics for L the push stack
operation is replaced by a set of stack pointer operations for modifying the stack at depth k, where
k depends on the existential depth of the preceding part of the formula (this is made precise in the
denition of the truth relation above). Note that quantications never can destroy previous dynamic
assignments in the same formula, but they can overwrite initially given values. In
P1; 9;Q1
the rst occurrence of the index 1 refers to the rst position of the input state, while the second
occurrence of 1 refers to this same position after it has been reset by 9. Thus, the two occurrences of
the same index do not co-refer.
For a translation from L to standard DPL we use a set of functions
k
: L
1
 ! DPL. The denition
of these functions uses the term translation

, and also the function e for existential depth.
(9)
k
:= 9x
k+1
(Pt
1
   t
n
)
k
:= Pt

1
   t

n
(A;)
k
:= A
k
;
k+e(A)
(:())
k
:= :()
k
:
Proposition 3 For all  2 L
1
:
M; ; 
0
j=
rdB
 i M; ; 
0
j=
dpl

0
:
7Proof. Again, we will prove a stronger statement by induction on the structure of , namely:
for all k 2 N : M; ; 
0
j=
k
 i M; ; 
0
j=
dpl

k
:
The existential quantier case: M; ; 
0
j=
k
9 i [k+1]
0
i M; ; 
0
j=
dpl
9x
k+1
i M; ; 
0
j=
dpl
(9)
k
.
The sequential composition case: M; ; 
0
j=
k
(A;) i there is a 
00
with
M; ; 
00
j=
k
A and M; 
00
; 
0
j=
k+e(A)

i (ind. hypothesis) there is a 
00
with
M; ; 
00
j=
dpl
A
k
and M; 
00
; 
0
j=
dpl

k+e(A)
i M; ; 
0
j=
dpl
A
k
;
k+e(A)
i (denition of
k
) M; ; 
0
j=
dpl
(A;)
k
. a
4. Offset Formulas
To make it into a suitable tool for the rational reconstruction of dynamic reasoning, the present
variable free account of dynamic predicate logic is in need of one further enhancement. Up until now
we have tacitly assumed that the stack manipulations which interpret the existential quantier start
at the rst position of the input assignment. This does not completely solve the problem of destructive
assignment, for in P1; 9;Q1 the rst occurrence of the index 1 refers to the rst position of the input
state, while the second index refers to this same position after it has been reset by 9. Thus, the
two occurrences of the same index do not co-refer. As long as we treat texts where every position is
existentially quantied over (the dynamic equivalent of closed formulas), this does not matter.
But we would like to cover open texts as well: sequences of formulas in which some positions take
their content from the surrounding context. After all, the process of picking up antecedents from
context is the essence of anaphoric linking. All we have to do is to shift the index from the dynamic
truth relation to the language itself. Let an oset formula be a pair (k; ) with k 2 N and  2 L
1
.
The interpretation of oset formulas is given by: f(; 
0
) j M; ; 
0
j=
k
g. An example:
(2; 9;R(1; 3);S(2; 3)):
This would correspond to the DPL formula:
9x
3
;Rx
1
x
3
;Sx
2
x
3
:
The translation function for mapping oset L formulas to DPL formulas is of course the mapping
k
dened in Section 3.
The positions 1; : : : ; k of oset formula (k; ) are not aected by the stack dynamics of the existential
quantier. The values of these positions are read from the input state; these are the anaphoric
references picked up from the surrounding context. Positions higher up on the stack may be aected
by an existential quantier action inside , or their values may be destroyed later in a subsequent
context. Call an oset formula bounded if it contains no such threatened positions (a formal denition
is given below).
If X  N and X nite, then sup(X) is dened by:
sup(;) := 0;
sup(fng [ Y ) := sup(n; sup(Y )):
An index n occurs open in a formula (k; ) if the occurrence of n is not in the dynamic scope of an
occurrence of 9, bound otherwise. To make this precise, we can use the function g which calculates the
greatest natural number that occurs as an unbound index in (k; ). The denition of g : N L
1
! N
is:
g(k; ) := g
0
(k; 0; );
8where g
0
: N  N  L
1
! N is given by:
g
0
(k;m; P t
1
   t
n
) := sup(ft
i
2 N
+
j 1  i  n; t
i
=2 [k::k +m]g)
g
0
(k;m; 9) := 0
g
0
(k;m;A;) := max(g
0
(k;m;A); g
0
(k;m+ e(A); ))
g
0
(k;m;:()) := g
0
(k;m; ):
For example:
g(2; 9;R(3; 4)) = 4;
g(3; 9;R(3; 4)) = 0:
Note that the second argument of g
0
keeps track of the growth of the range of bound numbers starting
from a given position.
Denition 4 An L formula is bounded if every occurrence of a number in it is bound by a preceding
occurrence of 9. An oset L formula (k; ) is bounded if its highest unbound number is less than or
equal to k. An L formula  is k-bounded if (k; ) is bounded.
It is useful to have a function for the highest unbound number in an oset L formula. Dene
m : (N  L
1
) ! N by means of m(k; ) := g(k; )
_
 k. An oset formula (k; ) is bounded i
m(k; ) = 0. This generalizes the notion of boundedness for L formulas, for an L formula is bounded
i m(0; ) = 0.
What m(k; ) = 0 says is that the free indices of (k; ) (indices having an occurrence in (k; ) which
is not dynamically bound by an occurrence of 9 in (k; )) all are in [1::k].
We will use [k::m] for the nite sequence (
k
; : : : ; 
m
) and [k::!] for the innite sequence (
k
; : : : ).
Lemma 5 (Finiteness lemma) Let an oset formula (k; ) be given. Let p := max(k;m(k; )) and
q := max(k + e();m(k; )) + 1. Assume (; 
0
) 2 [[k; ]]
M
. Then the following hold:
1. [1::k] = 
0
[1::k].
2. [q::!] = 
0
[q::!].
3. if [1::p] =  [1::p], 
0
[p+ 1::q] = 
0
[p+ 1::q] and  [q::!] = 
0
[q::!], then (; 
0
) 2 [[k; ]]
M
.
Proof. 1. Immediate from the truth denition.
2. An inspection of the denition of q shows that the values [q::!] are not aected by 9 actions.
3.  and  agree on the values that are read by , 
0
and 
0
on the values that are written by ,
; 
0
agree on the values that are neither read nor written. a
Lemma 6 (Monotonicity lemma) Assume (k; ) is bounded and suppose (; 
0
) 2 [[k; ]]
M
. Then
the following hold:
1. [k + e() + 1::!] = 
0
[k + e() + 1::!].
2. if [1::k] =  [1::k], 
0
[k+1::k+e()] = 
0
[k+1::k+e()] and  [k+e()+1::!] = 
0
[k+e()+1::!],
then (; 
0
) 2 [[k; )]]
M
.
Proof. Immediate from the niteness lemma and the denition of boundedness. a
It follows from the niteness lemma that one can dene the semantics of bounded oset formulas
in terms of nite assignments, as follows. We now take M

as the set of assignments for model
M = (M; I) and we use l() for the length of  2M

.  is the assignment of length 0. The assignment
9consisting only of element a is denoted a.  ^ denotes the concatenation of nite assignments  and
 .
(; ) 2 [[n;?]]
M
never;
(; ) 2 [[n; 9]]
M
i l() = n and  = a for some a 2M;
(; ) 2 [[n; P t
1
   t
k
]]
M
i l() = n and  =  and h[[t
1
]]
M

; : : : ; [[t
n
]]
M

i 2 R
M
;
(; ) 2 [[n;:]]
M
i l() = n and  =  and there is no 
0
with (; 
0
) 2 [[]]
M
;
(; ) 2 [[n; ; ]]
M
i l() = n; 
1
=  [1::e()]; 
2
=  [e() + 1::l()];
and (; 
1
) 2 [[n; ]]
M
; ( ^
1
; 
2
) 2 [[n+ e();  ]]
M
:
If (; ) 2 [[n; ]]
M
then  is the read memory and  the write memory used in the interpretation
process of n; .
Proposition 7 For all bounded (n; ), all models M, all ; 
0
2M
N
+
:
M; ; 
0
j=
n
 () ([1::n]; 
0
[n+ 1::n+ e()]) 2 [[n; ]]
M
() (
0
[1::n]; 
0
[n+ 1::n+ e()]) 2 [[n; ]]
M
:
5. Variable Free Dynamic Logic and Discourse Representation
Next, we want to show that oset formulas correspond exactly to Discourse Representation Structures
in the sense of Kamp [14]. DRSs are those structures dened by the following mutual recursion which
satisfy a variable constraint (stated below).
c ::= c
1
j c
2
j   
v ::= x
1
j x
2
j   
t ::= c j v
C ::= Pt
1
   t
n
j t
1
:
= t
2
j :D
D ::= (fv
1
; : : : ; v
n
g; fC
1
; : : : ; C
m
g)
Call the structures dened here proto DRSs. To dene DRSs, we need to distinguish three kinds of
variable occurrences in proto DRSs: (1) xed by the larger context, (2) xed in the current context,
and (3) xed in a subordinate context.
To dene these sets, we rst dene a function var on the atomic conditions of a DRS.
var(Pt
1
   t
n
) := ft
i
j 1  i  n; t
i
2 Ug
var(t
1
:
= t
2
) := ft
i
j 1  i  2; t
i
2 Ug
Denition 8 (x, intro, cbnd)
 x(fv
1
; : : : ; v
n
g; fC
1
; : : : ; C
m
g) :=
S
i
x(C
i
)  fv
1
; : : : ; v
n
g.
 intro(fv
1
; : : : ; v
n
g; fC
1
; : : : ; C
m
g) := fv
1
; : : : ; v
n
g.
 cbnd(fv
1
; : : : ; v
n
g; fC
1
; : : : ; C
m
g) :=
S
i
cbnd(C
i
).
 x(Pt
1
   t
n
) := var(Pt
1
   t
n
), intro(Pt
1
   t
n
) := ;, cbnd(Pt
1
   t
n
) := ;.
 x(t
1
:
= t
2
) := var(t
1
:
= t
2
), intro(t
1
:
= t
2
) := ;, cbnd(t
1
:
= t
2
) := ;.
 x(:D) := x(D), intro(:D) := ;, cbnd(:D) := intro(D) [ cbnd(D).
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DRSs are the proto-DRSs D with intro(D) \ x(D) = ;, (and the same condition imposed on
subordinate DRSs D
0
).
If D = (fv
1
; : : : ; v
n
g; fC
1
; : : : ; C
m
g) and D
0
are DRSs, then D ) D
0
abbreviates the condition
:(fv
1
; : : : ; v
n
g; fC
1
; : : : ; C
m
;:D
0
g):
We give a translation function
[k]
from oset formulas to DRSs (where k is the oset), as follows
(using 
[k]
0
and 
[k]
1
for the rst and second components of 
[k]
):
(Pt
1
   t
n
)
[k]
:= (;; fPt

1
   t

n
g)
(t
1
:
= t
2
)
[k]
:= (;; ft

1
:
= t

2
g)
(9)
[k]
:= (fx
k+1
g; ;)
(A;)
[k]
:= (A
[k]
0
[ 
[k+e(A)]
0
; A
[k]
1
[ 
[k+e(A)]
1
)
(:())
[k]
:= (;;:
[k]
):
Example:
(R(1; 2); 9;R(1; 3))
[2]
=
x
3
Rx
1
x
2
Rx
1
x
3
Proposition 9 If (k; ) is bounded, then:
1. 
[k]
is a DRS.
2.  veries 
[k]
in M (in the sense of DRT) i there is a 
0
with M; ; 
0
j=
k
.
Proof. Both claims are proved by induction on the structure of . a
The DRS translations have the additional property that they yield pure DRSs: If K
0
is a sub-DRS
K then their sets of introduced markers will be disjoint.
A special case is the case of bounded (0; ). These correspond precisely to so-called proper DRSs,
i.e., DRSs without `anchored' (or `xed') variable occurrences.
6. Merging Offset Formulas
Suppose we want to `merge' two oset formulas (n; ) and (m; ) in left-to-right order, in such a way
that the output of (n; ) serves as input to (m; ). One could dene a merge operation  as a partial
operation on oset formulas, dened as follows:
(n; )  (m; ) :=

(n; ; ) if m = n+ e();
undened otherwise.
In case the result of merging (n; ) and (m; ) is undened all is not lost, however. The undenedness
may be due to the fact that m < n + e() or to the fact that m > n + e(). In the rst case, the
problem can be remedied by performing a `write memory shift operation' on (m; ), as follows:
(m; )
(m+ k; [
m
+k
] )
11
Here, [
m
+k
] is the index substitution which replaces every i > m by i+k. Here is a formal denition:
[
m
+k
]t :=
8
<
:
t if t 2 C;
t if t 2 N; t  m;
t+ k if t 2 N; t > m
[
m
+k
]9 := 9
[
m
+k
]Pt
1
   t
n
:= P [
m
+k
]t
1
   [
m
+k
]t
n
[
m
+k
](A;) := [
m
+k
]A; [
m
+k
]
[
m
+k
]: := :[
m
+k
]:
Proposition 10 (; ) 2 [[m; ]]
M
i for all  2M
k
: ( ^; ) 2 [[m+ k; [
m
+k
] ]]
M
.
The other case where the result of merging (n; ) and (m; ), in that order, is undened, is the case
where m > n + e(). In this case we can use `existential padding'. A useful abbreviation for this is
9
k
, dened recursively as follows:
9
0
:= >
9
k+1
:= 9; 9
k
Existential padding is applied as follows:
(m+ k;  )
(m; 9
k
; )
Proposition 11 If (; ) 2 [[m+ k;  ]]
M
then ([1::m]; [m+ 1::l()]^ ) 2 [[m; 9
k
; ]]
M
.
The rules for memory shift and existential padding are built into the calculus of Section 9.
7. The Merge Problem in Discourse Representation Theory
As Proposition 9 has shown us, the rational reconstruction of discourse representation theory or DRT
[14] is not DPL but reverse De Bruijn indexing for L. In fact, the reconstruction has made us sensitive
to a distinction which is left implicit in DRT: the distinction between representation structures which
contain anchors (reference markers not introduced in the structure itself but imported from a pre-
existing representation) and representation structures which do not (no reference markers are imported
from outside; every marker gets introduced in the structure itself).
The variable constraint imposed in DRT avoids the destructive assignment problem from DPL, but
makes it harder to look at DRT in a compositional way (see Van Eijck and Kamp [9] for discussion).
A compositional perspective is readily available once we are prepared to use variable free notation.
Several possible solutions to the merge problem for DRT are discussed in Van Eijck and Kamp [9].
If one wants merge to be a total operation on DRSs, the merge of DRSs D and D
0
, in that order, may
involve substitution of the introduced variables of D
0
.
The present variable free perspective on dynamic logic suggests yet another way to merge represen-
tation structures. The DRS translations of oset formulas have the following general form:
x
m+1
; : : : ; x
n
C
1
.
.
.
C
k
12
Here it is assumed that all the markers occurring in C
1
; : : : ; C
k
are among x
1
; : : : ; x
n
. The mark-
ers x
1
; : : : ; x
m
are the xed markers of the DRS, the markers x
m+1
  x
n
the introduced reference
markers.
Assuming that DRSs are all in this canonical form, we can merge them as follows, using substitution
to avoid variable clashes:
x
p+1
; : : : ; x
p+m
C
1
.
.
.
C
k

[x
p+m+1
=x
q+1
;::: ;x
p+m+n
=x
q+n
]
x
q+1
; : : : ; x
q+n
C
0
1
.
.
.
C
0
r
=)
x
p+1
; : : : ; x
p+m+n
C
1
.
.
.
C
k
C
0
1
[x
p+m+1
=x
q+1
; : : : ; x
p+m+n
=x
q+n
]
.
.
.
C
0
r
[x
p+m+1
=x
q+1
; : : : ; x
p+m+n
=x
q+n
]
Example:
x
2
; x
3
Rx
1
x
2
Sx
2
x
3

[x
4
=x
3
;x
5
=x
4
]
x
3
; x
4
Tx
1
x
4
V x
3
x
4
=)
x
2
; x
3
; x
4
; x
5
Rx
1
x
2
Sx
2
x
3
Tx
1
x
5
V x
4
x
5
This corresponds to the attempt to combine (1; 9; 9;R(1; 2);S(2; 3)) and (2; 9; 9;T (1; 4); V (3; 4)), in
that order. This is possible after memory shift right of the second formula over one position, to get
(3; 9; 9;T (1; 5); V (4; 5)). After this, the formulas (1; 9; 9;R(1; 2);S(2; 3)) and (3; 9; 9;T (1; 5); V (4; 5))
can be merged, with the following result:
(1; 9; 9;R(1; 2);S(2; 3); 9; 9;T (1; 5); V (4; 5):
The switch rules of the calculus of Section 9 permit to transform this in turn into:
(1; 9; 9; 9; 9;R(1; 2);S(2; 3);T (1; 5);V (4; 5);
which again corresponds to (a canonical representation of) the result DRS.
8. Dynamic Reasoning Without Variables
The modelling of anaphoric presupposition as a context (a piece of read-only memory) suggests a very
natural consequence notion for `reasoning under anaphoric presupposition'. The anaphoric presuppo-
sition is given by an oset n, and under this oset  entails  i for all models, the interpretation of
 under this oset is `more informative' than that of  under the oset incremented with the eect
of processing . This gives the following denition:
13
Denition 12 n;  j=  :()
for all M; ;  : if (; ) 2 [[n; ]]
M
then there is a  with ( ^; ) 2 [[n+ e();  ]]
M
.
This consequence relation is truly dynamic in that it allows carrying anaphoric links from premiss to
conclusion. For example: from `a man walks and he talks' it follows that `he talks':
0; 9;M1;W1;T1 j= T1:
One of the problems with the dynamic consequence relation of DPL [10] is the fact that it is not
transitive, as witnessed by Van Benthem's example:
Suppose a man owns a house. Then he owns a garden.
Suppose a man owns a garden. Then he sprinkles it.
BUT NOT: Suppose a man owns a house. Then he sprinkles it.
This is indeed a counterexample against transitivity of j=
dpl
, where j=
dpl
is dened by:  j=
dpl
 i
for all M; ; 
0
: if M; ; 
0
j=
dpl
 then there is some 
00
with M; 
0
; 
00
j=  .
If we use oset formulas, the situation looks a bit dierent. The rational reconstruction of Van
Benthem's example now runs:
0; 9;M1; 9;H2;O(1; 2) j= 9;G3;O(1; 3) 2; 9;G3;O(1; 3) j= S(1; 3)
0; 9;M1; 9;H2;O(1; 2) j= 9;S(1; 3)
This is indeed a valid argument. Note that in the conclusion existential padding is used to provide
an antecedent for the index 3. The conclusion should be read as:
Suppose a man owns a house. Then there is a thing which he sprinkles.
This is of course the conclusion one would expect.
9. A Calculus for Reasoning With Anaphora
In this section, we will give a set of sequent deduction rules for dynamic reasoning without variables.
We will use n;  =)  for (n; ) =) (n + e();  ), where =) is the sequent separator. Note that
n;  =) ? expresses that (n; ) is inconsistent.
In the calculus we are about to present, we need some denitions for substitutions (in addition to
[
m
+k
]).
First a denition of (t)
n
:
(t)
n
(t
0
) :=
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
n+ 1 if t
0
= t
t
0
if t
0
2 C; t
0
6= t
t
0
if t
0
2 N; t
0
6= t; t
0
 n
t
0
+ 1 if t
0
2 N; t
0
6= t; t > n
(t)
n
? := ?
(t)
n
9 := 9
(t)
n
Pt
1
   t
m
:= P (t)
n
t
1
   (t)
n
t
m
(t)
n
(A;) := (t)
n
A; (t)
n

(t)
n
: := :(t)
n
:
Note that (n)
n
denotes the result of incrementing all indices > n. In other words, we have that
(n)
n
= [
n
+1
]. A useful abbreviation for (n)
n
is (n)
+
.
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Next, it is useful to have a notation for the substitution that replaces an index n by a term t and
`closes the gap'. Notation for this: (
t
=
n
)
 
.
(
t
=
n
)
 
(t
0
) :=
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
t if t
0
= n
t
0
if t
0
2 C
t
0
if t
0
2 N; t
0
< n
t
0
  1 if t
0
2 N; t > n
(
t
=
n
)
 
? := ?
(
t
=
n
)
 
9 := 9
(
t
=
n
)
 
Pt
1
   t
m
:= P (
t
=
n
)
 
t
1
   (
t
=
n
)
 
t
m
(
t
=
n
)
 
(A;) := (
t
=
n
)
 
A; (
t
=
n
)
 

(
t
=
n
)
 
: := :(
t
=
n
)
 
:
Note that (
n
=
n
)
 
is the substitition that decrements all indices > n. A useful abbreviation for this is
(n)
 
.
In the calculus, we use C, with and without subscripts, as a variable over contexts (formula lists
composed with ;, including the empty list). We extend the function e to contexts by stipulating that
e(C) = 0 if C is the empty list. Substitution is extended to contexts in a similar way. In the rules
below we will use T as an abbreviation of formulas  with e() = 0 (T for Test formula).
Structural Rules
Test Axiom
n; T =) T
g(n; T )  n
The condition on the axiom is necessary to rule out tests that are not n bounded. For instance, it
does not hold that 1; R(1; 2) =) R(1; 2), because the context does not provide an antecedent for the
index 2.
Soundness of Test Axiom If (; ) 2 [[n; T ]]
M
then  =  (because T is a test) and ( ^; ) 2 [[n; T ]]
M
.
Thus, n; T j= T .
Transitivity Rule
n;  =)  n+ e();  =) 
n;  =) 9
e( )

Note that in the case where the `cut' formula is a test, the rule assumes the familiar format:
n;  =) T n+ e(); T =) 
n;  =) 
Soundness of Transitivity Rule Suppose n;  j=  and n + e();  j= . Assume (; ) 2 [[n; ]]
M
.
Then by n;  j=  , there is a  with ( ^; ) 2 [[n + e();  ]]
M
. By n+ e();  j= , there is a  with
( ^ ^; ) 2 [[n+ e() + e( ); ]]
M
. Then by Proposition 11, ( ^;  ^) 2 [[n+ e(); 9
e( )
;]]
M
. Thus,
n;  j= 9
e( )
;.
Test Contraction Rules
n;C
1
T ;TC
2
=) 
n;C
1
TC
2
=) 
n;  =) C
1
T ;TC
2
n;  =) C
1
TC
2
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Note that contraction does in general not hold for formulas which are not tests. For instance, 9; 9
puts two elements on the stack, 9 only one.
There is also a rule for left weakening. Due to the format where ; serves as the concatenation
operator for formulas, the rule for ; left does double duty as an antecedent weakening rule. See below.
Succedent weakening would be the step from n;  =)  to n;  =) :(: ;:). This is taken care of
by the negation rules.
Soundness of Test Contraction Rules Immediate from the fact that if e() = 0 then (; ) 2
[[n; ;]]
M
i (; ) 2 [[n; ]]
M
.
Test Swap Rules
n;C
1
T
1
;T
2
C
2
=) 
n;C
1
T
2
;T
1
C
2
=) 
n;  =) C
1
T
1
;T
2
C
2
n;  =) C
1
T
2
;T
1
C
2
Soundness of Test Swap Rules Follows from the fact that [[m;T
1
;T
2
]]
M
= [[m;T
2
;T
1
]]
M
.
9 Swap Rules
n;C
1
T ; 9 C
2
=) 
n;C
1
9; (m)
+
TC
2
=) 
m = n+ e(C
1
)
n;  =) C
1
T ; 9 C
2
n;  =) C
1
9; (m)
+
TC
2
m = n+ e() + e(C
1
)
These rules allow us to pull 9 leftward through a test T , provided we increment the appropriate
indices in T .
Pulling 9 through a test T in the opposite direction is allowed in those cases where 9 does not bind
anything in T . Now we must adjust T by decrementing the appropriate indices:
n;C
1
9;TC
2
=) 
n;C
1
(m)
 
T ; 9 C
2
=) 
m = n+ e(C
1
);m+ 1 not in T
n;  =) C
1
9;TC
2
n;  =) C
1
(m)
 
T ; 9 C
2
m = n+ e() + e(C
1
);m+ 1 not in T
Soundness of 9 Swap Rules Soundness of the rules for moving 9 to the left follows from the fact
that (; ^ a) 2 [[m;T ; 9]]
M
i (; a^ ) 2 [[m; 9; (m)
+
T ]]
M
.
Soundness of the rules for moving 9 to the right follows from the fact that if index m+ 1 does not
occur in T , then (; a^ ) 2 [[m; 9;T ]]
M
i (; ^ a) 2 [[m; (m)
 
T ; 9]]
M
.
Context Rules
Memory Shift Rule
n;  =)  
n+ 1; (n)
+
 =) (n)
+
 
Soundness of Memory Shift Rule If (; ) 2 [[n; ]]
M
then for all a 2M , ( a^; ) 2 [[n+1; (n)
+
]]
M
.
Context Extension
n; 9; =)  
n+ 1;  =)  
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The counterpart to this, context absorption, is the rule for introducing an existential quantier in
the antecedent (see the logical rules below).
What context extension and absorption express is that linking information to an outside context is
equivalent, for all purposes of reasoning, to assuming that your information is existentially quantied
over. (This is how one can make sense of a ongoing conversation about an unknown `he': instead
of asking questions of identication that might interrupt the ow of the gossip one simply inserts an
existential quantier and listens to what is being said.)
Soundness of Context Extension Follows from the fact that (; ) 2 [[n; 9;]]
M
i for some a 2 M ,
( a^; ) 2 [[n+ 1; ]]
M
.
Logical Rules
9 Left
n+ 1;  =)  
n; 9; =)  
This rule of context absorption is simpler than the rule for introducing an existential quantier in the
antecedent of a sequent in standard predicate logic, where a condition must be imposed: the variable
existentially quantied over is not free in the context formulas. Such a condition is unnecessary here,
as the existential quantier binds all occurrences of index n+ 1.
Soundness of 9 Left Follows from the fact that (; ) 2 [[n; 9;]]
M
i for some a 2 M , (^a; ) 2
[[n+ 1; ]]
M
.
9 Right
n;  =) (
t
=
n+e()+1
)
 
 
n;  =) 9; 
This format is familiar from the Gentzen format of 9-right in standard predicate logic. Here is an
example application:
1; R(1; 1) =) R(1; 1)
1; R(1; 1) =) 9;R(1; 2)
R(1; 1) equals (
1
=
2
)
 
R(1; 2), so this is indeed a correct application of the rule.
Note that we can formulate a derived rule that looks perhaps more plausible:
n;  =)  
n;  =) 9; (t)
m
 
m = n+ e()
This follows from the parent version, because (
t
=
m+1
)
 
(t)
m
 =  . Easier to grasp, perhaps, but not
quite general enough, witness the fact that in the above example application of the parent rule R(1; 2)
is not of the form (1)
1
R(1; 1). The snag is in the fact that substitutions are dened in a uniform way.
(See Troelstra and Schwichtenberg [22] for extensive discussion of such issues of substitution in proof
theory.)
Soundness of 9 Right Assume a model M with input and output assignments ;  such that (; ) 2
[[n; ]]
M
. Let m = n+ e(). Then by the soundness of the premiss there is a  with
( ^; ) 2 [[m; (
t
=
m+1
)
 
 ]]
M
:
Let [[t]]
M
^
= a. Then, by the denition of the substitution (
t
=
m+1
)
 
, ( ^ a^; ) 2 [[m + 1;  ]]
M
. It
follows that ( ^; a^ ) 2 [[m; 9; ]]
M
. This proves n;  j= 9; .
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; Left and Right
n+ e();  =) 
n; ; =) 
n;  =)  n;  =) 
n;  =)  ; [
m
+e( )
]
m = n+ e()
The rst of these does double duty as a left weakening rule. Antecedent weakening is always
extension on the lefthand side. This is because extension on the righthand-side might aect the stack.
Weakening with a tests is valid anywhere in the antecedent; the swap rules account for that.
An example application of the rule for ; right is:
1; R(1; 1) =) 9;R(1; 2) 1; R(1; 1) =) 9;R(2; 1)
1; R(1; 1) =) 9;R(1; 2); 9;R(3; 1)
Soundness of ; Left Suppose (; ) 2 [[n; ; ]]
M
. Let 
1
:=  [1::e()] and 
2
:=  [e() + 1::l()].
Then ( ^
1
; 
2
) 2 [[n + e();  ]]
M
. By the soundness of the premiss, there is a  with ( ^
1
^
2
; ) 2
[[n+ e() + e( ); ]]
M
. Thus, ( ^; ) 2 [[n+ e() + e( ); ]]
M
. This establishes n; ; j= .
Soundness of ; Right Assume (; ) 2 [[n; ]]
M
. Then by the soundness of the second premiss, there
is a  with ( ^; ) 2 [[n+ e(); ]]
M
. By Proposition 10, for any  2M
e( )
,
( ^ ^; ) 2 [[n+ e() + e( ); [
n+e()
+e( )
]]]
M
:
By the soundness of the rst premiss, there is a  2 M
e( )
with ( ^; ) 2 [[n+ e();  ]]
M
. It follows
that ( ^;  ^) 2 [[n+ e();  ; [
n+e()
+e( )
]]]
M
. This establishes n;  j=  ; [
n+e()
+e( )
].
? Rule
n;  =)?; 
n;  =) ?
Note that the swap rules ensure that the position of ? in the succedent does not matter.
Soundness of ? Rule The rule expresses that ? denotes the empty relation: composition with ;
yields ;.
: Left and Right
n;  =)  
n; ;: =)?
n; ; =)?
n;  =) : 
Soundness of : Left Assume (; ) 2 [[n; ;: ]]
M
. Then (; ) 2 [[n; ]]
M
and there is no  with
( ^; ) 2 [[n+e();  ]]
M
. Contradiction with the soundness of the premiss. This establishes n; ;: j=
?.
Soundness of : Right Assume (; ) 2 [[n; ]]
M
. Then by the soundness of the premiss, there is no
 with ( ^; ) 2 [[n+ e();  ]]
M
. This establishes n;  j= : .
Double Negation Rules
n;  =) :: 
n;  =)  
n; ;:: =) ?
n; ; =)?
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Soundness of Double Negation Rules For Double Negation Left, assume (; ) 2 [[n; ]]
M
. Then by
the soundness of the premiss, there is no  with
( ^; ) 2 [[n+ e();: ]]
M
:
In particular, ( ^; ) =2 [[n+ e();: ]]
M
. Therefore, there is a  with
( ^; ) 2 [[n+ e();  ]]
M
:
This establishes n;  j=  . The soundness of Double Negation Right is established similarly.
This completes the presentation of the calculus. As we have checked the soundness of every rule as
we went along, we have:
Theorem 13 The Calculus for Reasoning with Anaphora is sound.
10. Derivable Rules for Reasoning with Anaphora
Proposition 14 (Start Rule) The following start sequent is derivable:
n;  =) [
n
+e()
]
g(n; )  n
Proof. We show by induction on the existential depth of  that there is a derivation of the start
sequent for .
For the case of e() = 0, the test axiom provides a derivation.
Suppose we have for all n;  with e() = k, that the relation holds (for arbitrary n). We have to
show that we can derive the rule for (n;  ) with e( ) = k+1 (again, for arbitrary n). Let (n;  ) be a
bounded formula with e( ) = k+1. Now any such formula can be thought of as the result of starting
out with a formula (n; 9;), with e() = k, and swapping the quantier inwards (by means of the
swap rules).
So we are done of we can show, for an arbitrary n, that n; 9; =) [
n
+e()+1
]9;, on the basis of the
following induction hypothesis:
n+ 1;  =) [
n+1
+e()
]:
This is established as follows:
n+ 1;  =) [
n+1
+e()
]
induction hypothesis
n; 9; =) [
n+1
+e()
]
9l
n; 9; =) [
n
+e()+1
]9;
9r
The nal step is perhaps in need of some further explanation. To understand the application of
9r, observe that [
n+1
+e()
] can be written as the result of applying substitution (
n+1
=
n+e()+2
)
 
to the
formula [
n
+e()+1
], all in the context n + 1 + e(). Applying 9r to this yields 9; [
n
+e()+1
], which is
equivalent to [
n
+e()+1
]9;. a
Here is a concrete application of the procedure from the proof of Proposition 14.
2; R(1; 2)) R(1; 2)
test axiom
2; R(1; 2)) 9;R(1; 3)
9r
1; 9;R(1; 2)) 9;R(1; 3)
9l
1; 9;R(1; 2)) 9; 9;R(3; 4)
9r
0; 9; 9;R(1; 2)) 9; 9;R(3; 4)
9l
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Proposition 15 (Contradiction Rule) The following rule is derivable:
n; ;: =) : n; ;: =) 
n;  =)  
Proof.
n; ;: =) : n; ;: =) 
n; ;: =) :;
; r
n+ e();: =) :
test axiom
n+ e();:;:: =) ?
:l
n+ e();:; =) ?
dn
n; ;: =) 9
e()
?
tr
n; ;: =) ?; 9
e()
swap
n; ;: =) ?
?
n;  =) :: 
:r
n;  =)  
dn
a
Proposition 16 (Cases Rule) The following rule is derivable:
n; ;: =)  n; ;:: =) 
n;  =) 
Proof.
n; ;: =) 
n; ;: ;: =)?
:l
n; ;:;: =)?
swap
n; ;: =) :: 
:r
n; ;:: =) 
n; ;:: ;: =) ?
:l
n; ;:;:: =) ?
swap
n; ;: =) ::: 
:r
n;  =) 
contrad
a
Proposition 17 (Contraposition Rule) The following rule is derivable:
n; ; =) 
n; ;:9
e( )
 =) : 
Proof. In the following, let m = n+ e() + e( ). We use 
0
for (m  e( ))
m
   (m)
m
. Then:
n; ; =) 
n; ; =) 9
e( )

0
9r; e( ) times
n; ; ;:9
e( )

0
=)?
:l
n; ;:9
e( )
; =) ?
swap
n; ;:9
e( )
 =) : 
:r
a
Here is a concrete example illustration:
1; 9;R(1; 2); 9; 9;S(2; 3; 4) =) T (3; 4)
1; 9;R(1; 2); 9; 9;S(2; 3; 4) =) 9;T (3; 5)
9r
1; 9;R(1; 2); 9; 9;S(2; 3; 4) =) 9; 9;T (5; 6)
9r
1; 9;R(1; 2); 9; 9;S(2; 3; 4);:(9; 9;T (5; 6)) =) ?
:l
1; 9;R(1; 2);:(9; 9;T (3; 4)); 9; 9;S(2; 3; 4) =) ?
swap
1; 9;R(1; 2);:(9; 9;T (3; 4)) =) :(9; 9;S(2; 3; 4))
:r
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Here is an example of this pattern of reasoning in natural language:
Suppose a man owns a house. Suppose it has a garden. Then he sprinkles it.
Suppose a man owns a house. Suppose he does not sprinkle anything.
Then it (the house) does not have a garden.
Proposition 18 (Ex Falso Rule) The following rule is derivable:
n;? =) 
Proof.
n;? =) ?
start
n;:;? =) ?
; l
n;?;: =) ?
swap
n;? =) ::
:r
n;? =) 
dn
a
Proposition 19 (Inconsistency Rule) The following rule is derivable:
n;  =) ?
n;  =)  
Proof.
n;  =)? n+ e();? =)  
ex falso
n;  =)  
tr
a
Proposition 20 The following rule is derivable:
n;  =)  
n; ;: =) 
Proof.
n;  =)  
n; ;: =) ?
:l
n; ;: =) 
incons
a
Proposition 21 (Conditionalisation Rule) The following rule is derivable:
n; ; =) 
n;  =)  ! 
Proof.
n; ; =) 
n; ; ;: =) ?
:l
n;  =) :( ;:)
:r
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a
An example of this pattern is in the following reasoning.
Suppose a man owns a house. Then he owns a garden.
Suppose there is a man. Then if he owns a house, he owns a garden.
Proposition 22 (:: Weakening With 9 Padding) The following rule is derivable:
n; ; =) 
n; ;:: =) 9
e( )

Proof.
n; ; =) 
n; ;:9
e()
 =) : 
contrap
n; ;:: =) ::9
e()

contrap
n; ;:: =) 9
e()

dn
a
Here is an example of this pattern:
1; 9;:R(2; 1) =) H(2; 1)
1;::(9;:R(2; 1)) =) 9H(2; 1)
Note that :9: expresses universal quantication. The natural language rendering of the example,
therefore, looks like this:
Suppose there is someone who does not respect her. Then he hates her.
Suppose not everyone respects her. Then someone hates her.
Proposition 23 (Modus Ponens With 9 Padding) The following rule is derivable:
n;  =)  !  n;  =)  
n;  =) 9
e( )

Proof.
n;  =) :( ;:)
n; ;::( ;:) =) ?
:l
n; ; ;: =) ?
dn
n; ; =) ::
:r
n; ; =) 
dn
n; ;:: =) 9
e( )

::w
n;  =)  
n; ;: =) ?
:r
n; ;: =) 9
e( )

incons
n;  =) 9
e( )

cases
a
An example of this pattern is in the following reasoning.
Suppose a man owns a house. Then if he owns a garden, he sprinkles it.
Suppose a man owns a house. Then he owns a garden.
Suppose a man owns a house. Then he sprinkles something.
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11. Completeness of the Calculus
To establish the completeness of the calculus, assume that 0;  6=)  . (Because of the context
extension rule, we may assume that the context is initially empty, for if it is not, and we have that
n;  6=)  for n 6= 0, then by context extension also 0; 9
n
; 6=)  .)
We will construct a countermodel by a slight modication of the standard Henkin construction
for the completeness of classical predicate logic. It is convenient to use k for e() throughout the
reasoning that follows.
Denition 24 A set of L formulas   is k-bounded if every  2   is k-bounded. If   is k-bounded,
we use (k; ) for the set of oset formulas f(k; ) j  2  g.
 `
 
 :, there are (k; 
1
); : : : ; (k; 
n
) 2 (k; ) with 0; ;::
1
;    ;::
n
=)  .
(k; ) is consistent with (0; ) if there is an k-bounded  with  6`
 
 .
(k; ) is negation complete with respect to (0; ) if for every k-bounded  either  `
 
 or  `
 
: 
(k; ) has witnesses for (0; ) if for every k-bounded 9; such that  `
 
9; there is a c for which
(k;::9 ! (
c
=
k+1
)
 
 ) 2 (k; ).
Note that in the denition of  `
 
 the extra premisses from   do not extend the `anaphoric
context': the context change potential of the premisses from   is blocked o by means of double
negation signs. This is a key element in the canonical model construction below.
Proposition 25 If  6`
 
 then at least one of   [ f g,   [ f: g is consistent with (0; ).
Proof. Use the Cases Rule. a
Let 9
1
; : : : be a list of all k-bounded formulas of L that start with 9. Let C
0
:= c
0
1
; : : : be a list of
fresh individual constants. Let L
0
be L(C
0
) (the result of adding the constants C
0
to L).

0
:= f::9
i
! (
c
0
i
=
k+1
)
 

i
j 1  ig:
Let 9
m
1
; : : : be a list of all k-bounded existential formulas which occur in L
m
. Let C
m+1
:= c
m+1
1
; : : :
be a list of fresh individual constants. Let L
m+1
:= L
m
(C
m+1
).

m+1
:= f::9
m+1
i
! (
c
m+1
i
=
k+1
)
 

m+1
i
j 1  ig:
Let C :=
S
m
C
m
, and let  be the set of L(C) formulas given by:
 :=
[
m

m
:
Proposition 26 If (k; ) consists of L(C) formulas, and (k; )  (k;), then (k; ) has witnesses
for (0; ).
Proof. Take some (k; 9 ) with  `
 
9 . Then 9 2 L
m
for some m. So there is some c 2 C with
::9 ! (
c
=
k+1
)
 
 2 
m+1
. So (k;::9 ! (
c
=
k+1
)
 
 ) 2 (k;)  (k; ). a
Proposition 27 If (k; ) is consistent with (0; ) then there is a (k; 
0
)  (k; ) which is consistent
with (0; ), negation complete with respect to (0; ), and has witnesses for (0; ).
Proof. Assume (k; ) consistent with (0; ). Let (k; 
1
); : : : ; (k; 
i
); : : : be an enumeration of all
bounded formulas of the language (k; L(C)). Extend (k; ) as follows to a (k; 
0
) with the required
properties.
(k; 
0
) := (k; ) [ (k;)
(k; 
m+1
) :=

(k; 
m
[ f
m
g) if (k; 
m
[ f
m
g) consistent with (0; );
(k; 
m
) otherwise.
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(k; 
0
) := (k;
[
m
 
m
)
(k; 
0
)  (k;), so by Proposition 26 (k; 
0
) has witnesses for (0; ).
Assume (k; 
0
) is inconsistent with (0; ). Then some (k; 
m
) has to be inconsistent with (0; ) and
contradiction with Proposition 25. So (k; 
0
) is consistent with (0; ).
Finally, (k; 
0
) is negation complete by construction. a
Denition 28 (Canonical Model) Let (k; ) be consistent with (0; ), be negation complete with
respect to (0; ), and have witnesses for (0; ). Then M
 
= (D; I) is dened as follows. D := the set
of natural numbers f1; : : : ; kg together with the set of constants C occurring in  [fg. For all terms
of the language, let I(t) := t. Let I(P ) := fht
1
; : : : t
k
i j  `
 
P (t
1
; : : : ; t
k
)g (where it is given that all
the t
i
are either constants or indices in the range 1; : : : ; k).
Lemma 29 (Satisfaction Lemma) Let (k; ) be consistent with (0; ), be negation complete with
respect to (0; ), and have witnesses for (0; ). For all k-bounded :
 `
 
 i 9 with (h1; : : : ; ki; ) 2 [[k; ]]
M
 
.
Proof. Induction on the structure of .
 6`
 
? by the fact that (0; ) is consistent and   is consistent with (0; ).
 `
 
Pt
1
   t
n
i ht
1
; : : : ; t
n
i 2 I(P ) i (h1; : : : ; ki; ) 2 [[k; P t
1
   t
n
]]
M
 
.
 `
 
: i (  negation complete)  6`
 
 i (i.h.) there is no  with (h1; : : : ; ki; ) 2 [[k; ]]
M
 
i
(semantic clause for :) (h1; : : : ; ki; ) 2 [[k;:]]
M
 
.
 `
 
9 i (  has witnesses)  `
 
(
c
=
k+1
)
 
 i (i.h.) there is a  with (h1; : : : ; ki; ) 2 [[k; (
c
=
k+1
)
 
]]
M
 
i (h1; : : : ; ki; hci^ ) 2 [[k; 9]]
M
 
.
For the case of 
1
; 
2
we argue as follows. If 
1
is not a test (i.e., it is not the case that e(
1
) = 0),
then 
1
must be of the form ; 9;
0
. In this case, the 9 quantier can be moved to the front using the
shift rules, and dealt with as in the previous case (associativity of ; is assumed throughout). What
this means is that we only have to deal with 
1
; 
2
where 
1
is a test.
For this case, we have:  `
 

1
; 
2
i (
1
is a test)  `
 

1
and  `
 

2
i (i.h. twice, plus the fact
that 
1
is a test) (h1; : : : ; ki; ) 2 [[k; 
1
]]
M
 
and there is a  with (h1; : : : ; ki; ) 2 [[k; 
2
]]
M
 
i there is
a  with (h1; : : : ; ki; ) 2 [[k; 
1
; 
2
]]
M
 
. a
Proposition 30 Let (k; ) be consistent with (0; ), be negation complete with respect to (0; ), and
have witnesses for (0; ). Then (; h1; : : : ; ki) 2 [[0; ]]
M
 
.
Proof. Let 9
k

0
be the result of applying the rule for moving 9 leftward as many times as necessary
to  to ensure that e(
0
) = 0. Then (0; ) and the formula (0; 9
k

0
) are proof equivalent. Furthermore,
we have:
k; 
0
=) 
0
proposition 14
0; 9
k

0
=) 
0
9l; k times
0;  =) 
0
swap rules
Therefore,  `
 

0
, and by the satisfaction lemma, (h1; : : : ; ki; ) 2 [[k; 
0
]]
M
 
. Also, by denition
of the semantics for 9, we have that (; h1; : : : ; ki) 2 [[0; 9
k
]]
M
 
. By the semantic equivalence of  and
9
k

0
we get (; h1; : : : ; ki) 2 [[0; ]]
M
 
. a
Theorem 31 (Completeness) If n;  j=  then n;  =)  .
Proof. Assume n;  6=)  . By context extension, it follows from this that 0; 9
n
 6=)  . Set

0
:= 9
n
 and set k := e(
0
). Then f(k;: )g is consistent with (0; 
0
). By proposition 27, there is
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a (k; )  f(k;: )g which is consistent with (0; 
0
), is negation complete with respect to (0; 
0
), and
has witnesses for (0; 
0
). Construct the canonical model and apply the satisfaction lemma to get:
(h1; : : : ; ki; ) 2 [[k;: ]]
M
 
:
By the semantic clause for negation we have that for all  :
(h1; : : : ; ki; ) =2 [[k;  ]]
M
 
:
By proposition 30:
(; h1; : : : ; ki) 2 [[0; 
0
]]
M
 
:
This proves 0; 
0
6j=  , i.e., 0; 9
n
; 6j=  , and therefore, n;  6j=  . a
12. Anaphoric Reasoning with Equality
Anaphoric linking makes extensive use of equality. See Van Eijck [8] for an in-depth analysis of
the use of equality in anaphoric descriptions. An anaphoric denite description like the garden can
be treated as a deniteness quantier followed by a link to a contextually available index. The
translation of He sprinkles the garden would then be something like 2;  : (3
:
= 2;G3);S(1; 3). Also,
the determiner an other often has an implicit anaphoric element. In such cases, the treatment involves
non-identity links to contextually available referents. He met an other woman gets a translation like
2; 9; 3 6= 2;W3;M(1; 3). Below we indicate how to handle equality, while leaving the axiomatisation
of deniteness in the present framework for another occasion.
For the treatment of equality, add expressions t
1
:
= t
2
to the language (we assume that t
1
6= t
2
is
an abbreviation of :(t
1
:
= t
2
)). Equalities are tests, or, in other words, e(t
1
:
= t
2
) = 0. To ensure that
n; t
1
= t
2
is bounded, we assume t
1
; t
2
2 Cons[f1; : : : ; ng. The semantics of equality is as you would
expect:
(; ) 2 [[n; t
1
:
= t
2
]]
M
i l() = n and  =  and [[t
1
]]
M

equals [[t
2
]]
M

:
The following rules must be added to the calculus to deal with equality statements:
Reexivity Axiom
n;  =) t
:
= t
t 2 Cons [ f1; : : : ; n+ e()g
Soundness of Reexivity Axiom The axiom expresses that equality is reexive.
Substitution Rule For this we need the notion (
t
1
=
t
2
) for substitution without incrementing or
decrementing indices. This is dened in the obvious way.
n;  =) (
t
1
=
t
2
) 
n; ; t
1
:
= t
2
=)  
t
1
; t
2
2 Cons [ f1; : : : ; n+ e()g
Example application:
0;> =) a
:
= a
re
0; a
:
= b =) b
:
= a
subst
For the correctness of this application, note that a
:
= a is of the form (
a
=
b
)b
:
= a.
0; a
:
= b =) a
:
= b
test axiom
0; a
:
= b; b
:
= c =) a
:
= c
subst
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For the correctness of this application, note that a
:
= b is of the form (
b
=
c
)a
:
= c.
3; 1
:
= 2 =) 1
:
= 2
test axiom
3; 1
:
= 2; 2
:
= 3 =) 1
:
= 3
subst
0; 9; 9; 9; 1
:
= 2; 2
:
= 3 =) 1
:
= 3
9l; 3 times
Soundness of the Substitution Rule Assume (; ) 2 [[n; ; t
1
:
= t
2
]]
M
. Then (; ) 2 [[n; ]]
M
, and
[[t
1
]]
M
^
= [[t
2
]]
M
^
. By the soundness of the premiss, there is a  with ( ^; ) 2 [[n; (
t
1
=
t
2
) ]]
M
.
Therefore, ( ^; ) 2 [[n+ e();  ]]
M
. This shows n; ; t
1
:
= t
2
j=  .
The completeness of the anaphoric calculus with equality is proved by modifying the Henkin con-
struction in the usual way (taking equivalence classes of terms under provable equality as elements of
the canonical model).
13. Conclusion
To wind up our story we mention some connections to related work. Via the translation to DRT in
Section 5 (proposition 9) we have a proof system for (a streamlined version of) DRT. The calculus
makes the discipline of using and modifying the anaphoric context and of handling dynamically bound
indices fully explicit, and still is considerably simpler than existing proof systems for DRT, such as
those presented in Kamp and Reyle [16] and Saurer [21].
When looking at the general picture of dynamic reconstruction proposals for DRT, what may emerge
is that there is no single `best' reconstruction, but that various reconstructions shed light on dierent
aspects of the dynamics of text processing that all merit study in their own right. The present `calculus
of anaphora' focusses on the use of anaphoric context in reasoning, and gives a full account of the
ways in which pronouns may be used to pick up antecedents from previous discourse in reasoning.
The 9 of De Bruijn style classical predicate logic without variables can be viewed as a modal
operator. The connection with Ben-Shalom [4] was already mentioned. There is also a straightforward
connection to the cylindric algebra approach to rst order logic.
Finally we mention the connections with Dekker [7], where a similar representation is proposed,
but the problem of a calculus for reasoning is not addressed, with Visser and Vermeulen [24] and
Visser [27, 26], and with Blackburn and Venema [5] and Hollenberg [13]. To see the connection with
Hollenberg's equational axioms of dynamic negation and relational composition, note that these are
all derivable in the calculus of anaphora (as of course they should be). A comparison with Visser's
[25, 26] metamathematical analysis of DPL might answer the question: What are the DLWV denable
relations?
We hope to have shown that anaphoric presupposition has a natural representation in terms of
dynamic memory management: anaphoric presuppositions are minimum requirements on the amount
of input memory needed for an update of an existing meaning representation. Dynamic memory
management is represented very naturally by means of incremental indexing, in a `variable free'
language. The resulting reconstruction of dynamic reasoning is easier to handle than its predecessors,
as is witnessed by the fact that it is relatively easy to axiomatize.
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